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Race and the New Reproduction 
by 
DoRoTHY E. RoBERTs* 
Introduction 
New means of procreating are heralded by many legal scholars 
and social commentators as inherently progressive and liberating. In 
this view, in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo donation, and contract 
pregnancy expand the procreative options open to individuals and 
therefore enhance human freedom. These innovations give new hope 
to infertile couples previously resigned to the painful fate of childless-
ness. In addition, this view holds that the new reproduction creates 
novel family arrangements that break the mold of the traditional nu-
clear family. A child may now have five parents: a genetic mother and 
father who contribute egg and sperm, a gestational mother who car-
ries the implanted embryo, and a contracting mother and father who 
intend to raise the child.l A proponent of new means of reproduction, 
John Robertson opens his book Children of Choice by proclaiming 
that these "powerful new technologies" free us from the ancient sub-
jugation to "the luck of the natural lottery" and "are challenging basic 
notions about procreation, parenthood, family, and children."2 
My impression of these technologies, however, is that they are 
more conforming than liberating: they more often reinforce the status 
quo than challenge it. True, these technologies often free outsiders 
from the constraints of social convention and legal restrictions. They 
have helped single heterosexual women, lesbians, and gay men, whom 
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A. 1977, Yale College; 
J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. This is a written version of a talk presented at Rutgers 
University's Center for the Critical Analysis of Culture and University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law; I am grateful to the participants for their comments. Portions of 
this article are adapted from Dorothy E. Roberts , The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 209 
(1995). 
1. See generally John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"?: The Claims of 
Biology as the Basis fo r Parental Rights , 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 , 355 (1991); A ndrea E. 
Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 
YALE L.J. 187, 192-94 (1986). 
2. John Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHOicE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1995). 
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society regards as unqualified to raise children, to circumvent legal 
barriers to parenthood.3 Informal surrogacy arrangements between 
women, for example, may provide a means of self-help for women 
who wish to have children independently of men; moreover, they have 
the advantage of requiring no government approval, medical interven-
tion, or even sexual intercourse.4 
But these technologies rarely serve to subvert conventional fam-
ily norms. Most often they complete a traditional nuclear family by 
providing a married couple with a child.5 Rather than disrupt the ster-
eotypical family, they enable infertile couples to create one. Most 
IVF clinics only accept heterosexual married couples as clients,6 and 
most physicians have been unwilling to assist in the insemination of 
single women.7 The new reproduction's conservative function is often 
imposed by courts and legislatures, as well. Laws regulating artificial 
insemination contemplate use by a married woman and recognition of 
her husband as the child's father,8 and recent state legislation requir-
ing insurance coverage of IVF procedures applies only when a wife's 
eggs are fertilized using her husband's sperm.9 On the other hand, as 
Martha Field observes, courts have been willing to grant parental 
rights to sperm donors "when no other man is playing the role of fa-
ther for the child," such as when the mother is a lesbian or 
unmarried. 10 
3. See Nancy D . Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the N eeds of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional 
Families , 78 GEo. L.J . 459, 466 (1990) ; Sharon E . Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy 
and Gay Fathers, in KINDRED MAITERS: R ETHINK ING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE F AMILY 
102, 132-33 (Diana Tie tjens M eyers et a!. eds., 1993) . 
4. Juliette Zipper & Selma Sevenhuijsen , Surrogacy: Feminist Notions of Mother-
hood Reconsidered, in REPRODUcriVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND 
MEDICINE 118, 137-38 (Michelle Stanworth ed ., 1987). Under this arrangem ent , a fe rtile 
woman wo uld informally promise an infertile woman who wants a child to impregna te 
he rself with a man's sperm and to give the baby to the infertile woman for adoption. 
5. R obertson, supra note 2 , at 145 (noting that ass isted reproduction furthers the 
" primary a im to provide a couple with a child to live and rear in a two-pa rent fam ily") . 
6. Thomas A. Shannon, In Vitro Fertilization: Ethical Issues, in EMBRYos, E THICS, 
AND W OMEN'S RIGHTS: E XPLORING THE NEW REPRODUcriVE T ECHNOLOGIES 155, 163 
(Ela ine H offman Baruch e t a l. eds ., 1988) . 
7. D aniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikle r, Turkey-baster Babies: Th e Demedicalization of 
A rtificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 13-1 6 (1991) . 
8. Bartha M. Knoppers & Soni a LeBris , Recent A dvances in Medically Assisted Con-
ception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J .L. & MED. 329, 332-33, 346-47 (1991) ; 
Lisa C. Ik emoto, Destabiliz ing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation , 28 U.S .F. L. REv. 633, 
636-37 (1 994 ). 
9. See, e.g., Mo . CooE ANN., A rt. 48a, § 354 DD(3) (West 1995) ; HAw. REv. STAT. 
§ 431: 10A-11 6.5(3) (West 1995). 
10. MARTHA FIELD, SuRROGATE MoTHERHOOD 116 (1988). 
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Feminists have powerfully demonstrated that the new reproduc-
tion enforces traditional patriarchal roles that privilege men's genetic 
desires and objectify women's procreative capacity.l1 They make a 
convincing case that IVF serves more to help married men produce 
genetic offspring than to give women greater reproductive freedom. 12 
In this essay I will explore how these technologies reflect and rein-
force the racial hierarchy in America. I will focus primarily on in vitro 
fertilization because it is the technology least accessible to Black peo-
ple and most advantageous to those concerned about genetic link-
ages.13 The salient feature of in vitro fertilization that distinguishes it 
from other means of assisted reproduction is that it enables an infer-
tile couple to have a child who is genetically-related to the husband.l4 
I. The Role of Race in the New Reproduction 
A. Racial Disparity in the Use of Reproductive Technologies 
One of the most striking features of the new reproduction is that 
it is used almost exclusively by white people. Of course, the busiest 
fertility clinics can point to some Black patients; but they stand out as 
rare exceptions.15 Only about one-third of all couples experiencing 
infertility seek medical treatment at all; and only 10 to 15 percent of 
infertile couples use advanced techniques like IVF.16 Blacks make up 
a disproportionate number of infertile people avoiding reproductive 
technologies. 
When I was recently transfixed by media coverage of battles over 
adopted children, "surrogacy" contracts, and frozen embryos, a friend 
11. See, e.g. , Janice G. Raymond, W oMEN AS WoMBs: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES AND THE BATTLE O VER WoMEN's FREEDOM (1993); Barbara Ka tz Rothman, RECRE-
ATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); 
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Ca llahan ed., 
1995). 
12. See, e.g. , Susan Sherwin, No LoNGER PATIENT: FEMINIST Ennes AND HEALTH 
CARE 127 (1992). 
13. I capitalize the "B" in Black Americans because I believe that Black Americans 
consider themselves to be an ethnic group, like Asian-Americans, whereas I believe that 
white Americans do not see themselves in that way. 
14. As I explain below, many women who could conceive through artific ia l insemina-
tion prefer the more expensive and risky IYF because it can produce a baby with a genet ic 
link to their husband. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
15. See Lori B . Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternmive Reproducrion, 65 S. CAL. 
LREv. 623,646 (1991); F .P. Haseltine eta!. , Psychologicallnrerviews in Screening Couples 
Undergoing In Vitro Fertilizarion , 442 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Scr. 504, 507 (1985); Martha 
Southgate, Coping with Infertility, EsSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 28, 28. 
16. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDI CAL AND SOCIAL 
CHOICES (OTA-BA-358) 7, 49-60 (1988). 
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questioned my interest in the new methods of reproduction. "Why 
are you always so fascinated by those stories?," he asked. "They have 
nothing to do with Black people."17 Think about the images con-
nected with reproduction-assisting technologies: They are almost al-
ways of white people. And the baby in these stories often has blond 
hair and blue eyes-as if to emphasize her racial purity. A "Dona-
hue" show featured the family of the first public surrogacy adoption. 
Their lawyer Noel Keane describes the baby, Elizabeth Anne, as 
"blonde-haired, blue-eyed, and as real as a baby's yell."18 He con-
cludes, "The show was one of Donahue's highest-rated ever and the 
audience came down firmly on the side of what Debbie, Sue, and 
George had done to bring Elizabeth Anne into the world."19 
In January, 1996, the New York Times launched a prominent 
four-article series entitled The Fertility Market, and the front page 
photograph displayed the director of a fertility clinic surrounded by 
seven white children conceived there while the continuing page fea-
tured a set of beaming IVF triplets, also white.20 
When we do read news accounts involving Black children created 
by these technologies they are always sensational stories intended to 
evoke revulsion at the technologies' potential for harm. In 1990, a 
white woman brought a lawsuit against a fertility clinic which she 
claimed had mistakenly inseminated her with a Black man's sperm, 
rather than her husband's, resulting in the birth of a Black child.21 
Two reporters covering the story speculated that "[i]f the suit goes to 
trial, a jury could be faced with the difficult task of deciding the dam-
ages involved in raising an interracial child. "22 Although receiving the 
wrong gametes was an injury in itself, the fact that the gametes were 
of the wrong race added a unique dimension of harm to the error. 
In a similar, but more bizarre, incident in the Netherlands in 
1995, a woman who gave birth to twin boys as a result of IVF realized 
when the babies were two months old that one was white and one was 
17. 1 first recounted this story in Roberts, supra note *,at 209. 
18. Noel P. Keane & Dennis L. Breo, T HE SuRROGATE MOTHER 96 (1981). 
19. !d. 
20. Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope 's Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, 
at 1, 10. 
21 . Robin Schatz, "Sperm Mixup " Spurs Debate: Questioning Safeguards, R egula-
rions, N.Y. N EWSDA Y, Mar. 11 , 1990, a t 3; Ronald Sulli van, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of 
a Mixup, N.Y TI MES, Mar. 9, 1990, at Bl. 
22. Barbara Kantrowitz & David A. Kaplan , Not the R ighi Farher, N EwswEEK, Ma r. 
19, 1990, a t 50, 50. 
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Black.23 A Newsweek article subtitled "A Fertility Clinic's Startling 
Error" reported that "while one boy was as blond as his parents, the 
other's skin was darkening and his brown hair was fuzzy."24 
It is easy to conclude that the stories displaying blond-haired 
blue-eyed babies born to white parents are designed to portray the 
positive potential of the new reproduction, while the stories involving 
the mixed-race children reveal its potential horror. 
These images and the predominant use of IVF by white couples 
indisputably reveal that race in some way helps to shape both the use 
and popularity of IVF in America. What are the reasons underlying 
this connection between race and the new reproduction? 
First, the racial disparity in new reproduction has nothing to do 
with rates of infertility. Married Black women have an infertility rate 
one and one-half times higher than that of married white women.25 In 
fact, the profile of people most likely to use IVF is precisely the oppo-
site of those most likely to be infertile. The people in the United 
States most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black and poorly 
educated.26 Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly edu-
cated, and affluent.27 
Besides, the new reproduction has far more to do with enabling 
people (mostly men) to have children who are genetically related to 
them than with helping infertile people to have children.28 T'ne well-
known "surrogacy" cases such as Baby M and Anna I. involved fertile 
white men with infertile wives who hired gestational mothers in order 
to pass on their own genes. Moreover, at least half of women who 
undergo IVF are themselves fertile , although their husbands are not.29 
These women could conceive a child far more safely and inexpensively 
by using artificial insemination although the child would not be genet-
23. Dorinda Elliott & Friso Endt, Twins-With Two Fathers; The Netherlands: A Fer-
tility Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38, 38. 
24. !d. 
25. Lauri e Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, Reproductive Technology: Perspectives 
and Implications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEA LING TECHNOL-
OGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 93, 108 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff et al. eds. , 1989). 
26. Sevgi 0. Aral & Willard Cates, Jr., The Increasing Concern Wirh Infenility: Why 
Now?, 250 JAMA 2327, 2327 (1983). 
27. Andrews & Douglass, supra note 15, at 646. 
28. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction to REPRODUCTION , ETHICS AND THE LAw: FEivii-
NIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 24-25. 
29. Raymond, supra note 11, at 6; Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Parriarchal Bar-
gain?: Women's Consent to In Vitro Fertilization in i'Vlale Infeni!ity, in FEMINIST P E RSPEC-
TIVES IN IVIEDICAL ETHICS 169, 171 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M . Purdy eds., 
1992). 
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ically-related to the husband. Underlying their use of IVF, then, is 
often their husbands' insistence on having a genetic inheritance. In 
short, use of reproduction-assisting technologies does not depend 
strictly on the physical incapacity to produce a child. 
Instead, the reason for the racial disparity in fertility treatment 
appears to be a complex interplay of financial barriers, cultural prefer-
ences, and more deliberate professional manipulation. The high cost 
of the IVF procedure places it out of reach of most Black people 
whose average median income falls far below that of whites. The me-
dian cost of one procedure is about $8,000; and, due to low success 
rates, many patients try several times before having a baby or giving 
up.30 Most medical insurance plans do not cover IVF, nor is it in-
cluded in Medicaid benefits.31 IVF requires not only huge sums of 
money, but also a privileged lifestyle that permits devotion to the ar-
duous process of daily drug injections, ultrasound examinations and 
blood tests, egg extraction, travel to an IVF clinic, and often multiple 
attempts-a luxury that few Black people enjoy. As Dr. O'Delle 
Owens, a Black fertility specialist in Cincinnati explained, "'For White 
couples, infertility is often the first roadblock they've faced-while 
Blacks are distracted by such primary roadblocks as food, shelter and 
clothing."'32 Black people's lack of access to fertility services is also 
an extension of their more general marginalization from the health 
care system. 
There is evidence that some physicians and fertility clinics may 
deliberately steer Black patients away from reproductive technolo-
gies. For example, doctors are more likely to diagnose white profes-
sional women with infertility problems such as endometriosis that can 
be treated with in vitro fertilization. 33 In 1976, one doctor found that 
over 20 percent of his Black patients who had been diagnosed as hav-
ing pelvic inflammatory disease, often treated with sterilization, actu-
ally suffered from endometriosis.34 
30. Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10-11. 
31. Annetta Miller et al. , Baby Makers Inc., NEWSWE EK, June 29, 1992, at 38, 38; 
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10; George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 L. 
ED. HEALTH CARE 27, 28 (1988) . Only 10 states require insurance coverage of IVF. 
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10. 
32. Monique Burns, A Sexual Tim e Bomb: The Declining Fertility Rate of che Black 
!'lliddle Class, EBONY, May 1995, at 74, 76. 
33. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Desrabiliz ing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legisiation, 28 U.S.F. L. 
.f->.EV . 633, 639 (1994). 
34. Don ald L. Chatm an, Endomerriosis in the Biack Woman, 125 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 
(.?,; GYNECOLOGY 987, 987 (1976) . 
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Screening criteria not based specifically on race tend to exclude 
Black women, as well. Most Black children in America today are 
born to single mothers, so a rule requiring clients to be married would 
work disproportionately against Black women desiring to become 
mothers. One IVF clinic addresses the high cost of treatment by of-
fering a donor oocyte program that waives the IVF fee for patients 
willing to share half of their eggs with another woman.35 The egg re-
cipient in the program also pays less by forgoing the $2000 to $3000 
cost for an oocyte donor.36 I cannot imagine that this program would 
help many Black patients, since it is unlikely that the predominantly 
white clientele would be interested in donations of their eggs. 
The racial disparity in the use of reproductive technologies may 
be partially self-imposed. The myth that Black people are overly fer-
tile may make infertility especially embarrassing for Black couples.37 
One Black woman who eventually sought IVF treatment explained, 
"Being African-American, I felt that we're a fruitful people and it was 
shameful to have this problem. That made it even harder. "38 Blacks 
may find it more emotionally difficult to discuss their problem with a 
physician, especially considering the paucity of Black specialists in this 
field. Blacks may also harbor a well-founded distrust of technological 
interference with their bodies and genetic material at the hands of 
white physicians. 
Finally, Blacks may have an aversion to the genetic marketing 
aspect of the new reproduction. Black folks are skeptical about any 
obsession with genes. TI1ey know that their genes are considered un-
desirable and that this alleged genetic inferiority has been used for 
centuries to justify their exclusion from the economic, political and 
social mainstream. Only last year Richard Herrnstein & Charles lVIur-
ray's The Bell Curve was a national bestseller, and it reopened the 
public debate about racial differences in intelligence and the role ge-
netics should play in social policy.39 
Blacks have understandably resisted defining personal identity in 
biological terms. Blacks by and large are more interested in escaping 
the constraints of racist ideology by defining themselves 2part from 
inherited traits. They tend to see group membership as a political and 
35. C o oPER CENTER FOR IVF, Cooper Cenrer fo r lVF Responds to rhe Fenili1y Mar-
ket, N.Y. T IMES, Jan . 1.:1., 1996, at 16 (advertisemen t) . 
36. !d. 
37. Martha Southgate , Coping with Jnfeni!iry, EssENCE, Sepi. 1994, ct 28, 28. 
38. .!d. 
39. See Richard J. H errnstein & Charles Murray, T HE BELL Cuxvc:: Ic r TC:LUGE:~;cE 
AND C L ASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN L IFE (199L1). 
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cultural affiliation. Their family ties have traditionally reached be-
yond the bounds of the nuclear family to include extended kin and 
non-kin relationships. 
My experience has been that fertility services simply are not a 
subject of conversation in Black circles, even among middle-class pro-
fessionals. While I have recently noticed stories about infertility ap-
pearing in magazines with a Black middle-class readership such as 
Ebony and Essence, these articles conclude by suggesting that child-
less Black couples seriously consider adoption.40 Black professional 
women I know are far more concerned about the assault that recent 
welfare reform efforts are inflicting on our poorer sisters' right to bear 
children-an assault that devalues all Black women and children in 
America.41 
Moreover, Black women are also more concerned about the 
higher rates of sterilization in our community, a disparity that cuts 
across economic and educational lines. One study found that 9.7 per-
cent of college-educated Black women had been sterilized, compared 
to 5.6 percent of college-educated white women.42 The frequency of 
sterilization increased among poor and uneducated Black women. 
Among women without a high school diploma, 31.6 percent of Black 
women and 14.5 percent of white women had been sterilized.43 
B. The Importance of the Genetic Tie 
Race also influences the importance we place on IVF's central 
aim-having genetically-related children. 
Of course sharing a genetic tie with children is important to peo-
ple of different races and in racially homogeneous cultures. Most par-
ents I know take great satisfaction in ha';ing children who "take after 
them. " It seems almost natural for people to want to pass down their 
genes to their children, as if they achieve a form of immortality by 
continuing their "blood line" into future generations. 
Yet we also know that the desire to have genetically-related chil-
dren is influenced, if not created, by our culture. A number of femi-
nists have advocated abandoning the genetic model of parenthood 
because of its origins in patriarchy and its "preoccupation with male 
40. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 32, at 148; Southgate, supra note 37, at 28. 
41. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Ciiizenship, 105 YALE 
L.J. 1563, 1582 (1996) (book review). 
42. LEVIN & TAUB, Reproductive Rights, in WoMEN AND THE LAw sec. 10A.07[3J[b] , 
lOA-28 (C. Lefcourt ed., 1989). 
43. Id. 
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seed. "44 We should add to these concerns the tremendous impact that 
the inheritability of race has had on the meaning of the genetic tie in 
American culture. 
The social and legal meaning of the genetic tie helped to maintain 
a racial caste system that preserved white supremacy through a rule of 
racial purity.45 The contradiction of slavery existing in a republic 
founded on a radical commitment to liberty required a theory of racial 
hierarchy. Whites took the hereditary trait of race and endowed it 
with the concept of racial superiority and inferiority;46 they main-
tained a clear demarcation between Black slaves and white masters by 
a violently enforced legal system of racial classification and sexual 
taboos.47 
The genetic tie to a slave mother not only made the child a slave 
and subject to white domination; it also passed down a whole set of 
inferior traits. Children born to a slave, but fathered by the white 
master, automatically became slaves, not members of the master's 
family. To this day, one's social status in America is determined by 
the presence or absence of a genetic tie to a Black parent. Con-
versely, the white genetic tie-if free from any trace of blackness--is 
an extremely valuable attribute entitling a child to a privileged status, 
what Cheryl Harris calls the "property interest in whiteness."48 
For several centuries a paramount objective of American law and 
social convention was keeping the white bloodline free from Black 
contamination. It was only in 1967 that the United States Supreme 
Court in Loving v. Virginia49 ruled antimiscegenation laws unconstitu-
tional. Thus, ensuring genetic relatedness is important for many rea-
sons, but, in America, one of those reasons has been to preserve white 
racial purity. 
44. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction to REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAw: FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11 , at 1, 11. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 11, at 39; Chris-
tine Overall, ETHICS AND HuMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 149 (1987) 
(noting that "the need for a genetic connection with one 's offspring seems to be of particu-
lar importance to men"). 
45. Roberts, supra note *, at 223-30. 
46. See Stephen Jay Gould, THE MrsMEASURE OF MAN (1981). 
47. Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Puriry and Interracial 
Sex in rhe Law of Colonial and A ntebellum Virginia, 77 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1967, 1967-68 
(1989). 
48. Cheryl I. Harris, Whireness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1713 (1993). 
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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C. ·value of Ted-ano~ogirallly Created Children 
Finally, the new reproduction graphically reflects and reinforces 
the disparate values placed on members of social groups. 
The monumental effort , expense and technological invention that 
goes into the new reproduction marks the children produced as espe-
cially valuable. It proclaims the unmistakable message that white chil-
dren are precious enough to devote billions of dollars towards their 
creation. Black children, on the other hand, are the primary object of 
welfare reform measures designed to discourage poor women from 
procreating. 
H. limpnk~tfioillls f,mr Policy Regmrding the New Reproduction 
\A/hat does it mean that we live in a country in which white wo-
men disproportionately use expensive technologies to enable them to 
bear children, while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery 
that prevents them from being able to bear any? Surely this contra-
diction must play a critical part in our deliberations about the morality 
of these technologies. What exactly does race mean for our own un-
derstanding of the new reproduction? 
Let us consider three possible responses. First, we might ac-
knowledge that race influences the use of reproductive technologies, 
but decide this does not justify interfering with individuals ' liberty to 
use them. Second, we could work to ensure greater access to these 
technologies by lowering costs or including IVF in insurance plans. 
Finally, we might determine that these technologies are harmful and 
that their use should therefore be discouraged. 
l rte liberal response to this racial disparity is that it stems fror.n 
the econornic and social structure, not from individuals' use of repro-
ducti've technologies. Protection of individuals' procreative liberty 
should prohibit government intervention in the choice to use IVF, as 
long as that choice itself d ces not harm anyone.5° Currently, there is 
little go-vernment sup.ervision of reproduction-assisting technologies, 
and ::-n.any proponents fear legal regulation of these new means of re -
-ororh et·i,- .T, Tn -'hpj - >'iew n:-nancial and "OCI.al'oarrJ·er" ·<o I~V>C' a·'"e ' J"'l -1 - -... --~ _,., -.l.. ._,. .L- . -'--- 4 tll 'W •• l "- ' ~ - ! ,3..r:: J - v \.. .i . .l \..-1..:. 
fortun8.te but inaovrouriate reaso:ns to interfere with the choices of 
L .1 .l 
... : ·1:.-_ • n"P ·"r:•·•--,,n ,,·;·p " "''"1-ta"h t o hav"" " " C"'"" ·'o this 'L-erhnolocry ""l,To,· a.:~-- -0 -- _~_ ... _ • .!. ·""-~ -- "- --~ .... " "" c ... ! ...... . _ 6.:..~. _ ..!. - ...,.. c:.. ~ ..... vv ...... 1.. _ _ ,_...... b . ~ 1. , __ ....,.. 
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cording to the liberal response, does the right to use these technolo-
gies entail any government obligation to provide access to them. And 
if for cultural reasons Blacks choose not to use these technologies, tb_is 
is no reason to deny them to people who have different cultural 
values. 
Perhaps we should not question infertile couples ' motives for 
wanting genetically-related children. After all, people who have chil-
dren the old-fashioned way may also practice a form of genetic selec-
tion when they choose a mate. The desire to share genetic traits with 
our children may not reflect the eugenic notion that these particular 
traits are superior to others; rather, as Barbara Berg notes, "these 
characteristics may simply symbolize to the parents the child's connec-
tion to past generations and the ability to extend that lineage forward 
into the future."51 Several people have responded to my concerns 
about race by explaining to me, "White couples want white children 
not because of any belief in racial superiority, but because they want 
children who are like them." 
Moreover, the danger of government scrutiny of people's motives 
for their reproductive decisions may override my concerns about ra-
cism. This danger leads some feminists who oppose the practice of 
using abortion as a sex selection technique, for example, nevertheless 
to oppose its legal prohibition.52 As Tabitha Powledge explained: 
To forbid women to use prenatal diagnostic techniques as a way of 
picking the sexes of their babies is to begin to delineate acceptable 
and unacceptable reasons to have an abortion ... . I hate these 
technologies, but I do not want to see them legally regulated be-
cause, quite simply, I do not want to provide an opening wedge for 
legal regulation of reproduction in generaP3 
It would be similarly unwise to permit the government to question 
individuals' reasons for deciding to use reproduction-assisting 
technologies. 
B. The D istributive §oHUJlitUO!lil 
The distributive solution does not question individuals' motives in 
order to question the societal impact of a practice. 54 This approach to 
51. Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION , En-I-
ICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECfiVES , supra note 11, at 80, 82. 
52. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction, Parr II: Prenatal and Postnatal Authority to R E-
PRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 133-134. 
53. Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: Orz Choosing Children's Sex, in TEE 
CusTOM-MADE CHILD?: V/oiviEN ·CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 193, 197 (Helen B. Holmes et 
al. eds., 1981). 
54. See O verall, supm nore at 17-39. 
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procreative liberty places more importance on reproduction's social 
context than does the liberal focus on the fulfillment of individual 
desires.55 Policies governing reproduction not only affect an individ-
ual's personal identity; they also shape the way we value each other 
and interpret social problems. The social harm that stems from con-
fining the new reproduction largely to the hands of wealthy white 
couples might be a reason to demand equalized access to these 
technologies. 
Obviously the unequal distribution of wealth in our society pre-
vents the less well off from buying countless goods and services that 
wealthy people can afford. But there may be a reason why we should 
be especially concerned about this disparity when it applies to 
reproduction. 
Reproduction is special. Government policy concerning repro-
duction has tremendous power to affect the status of entire groups of 
people. This is why the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma de-
clared the right to bear children to be "one of the basic civil rights of 
man."56 "In evil or reckless hands," Justice Douglas wrote, the gov-
ernment's power to sterilize "can cause races or types which are inimi-
cal to the dominant group to wither and disappear."57 This explains 
why in the Casey opinion Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
stressed the importance the right to an abortion had for women's 
equal social status. It is precisely the connection between reproduc-
tion and human dignity that makes a system of procreative liberty that 
privileges the wealthy and powerful particularly disturbing. 
Procreative liberty's importance to human dignity is a compelling 
reason to guarantee the equal distribution of procreative resources in 
society. Moreover, the power of unequal access to these resources to 
entrench unjust social hierarchies is just as pernicious as government 
interference in wealthy individuals' expensive procreative choices. 
'Ne might therefore address the racial disparity in the use of reproduc-
tive technologies by ensuring through public spending that their use is 
not concentrated among affluent white people. Government subsi-
dies, such as :rviedicaid coverage of IVF, and legislation mandating pri-
55. For a more extended critique of the liberal approach to reprodu-::tion-assisting 
technologies, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty, and the Limits of 
Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995); Joan C. 
Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-As-
sisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory , _ KY. L. REv. _ 
(forthcoming 1996). 
56. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
57. !d. 
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vate insurance coverage of IVF would allow more diverse and 
widespread enjoyment of the new reproduction. 
C. Should We Discourage the New Reproduction? 
If these technologies are in some ways positively harmful, will ex-
panding their distribution in society solve the problem? The racial 
critique of the new reproduction is more unsettling than just its expo-
sure of the maldistribution of fertility services. It also challenges the 
importance that we place on genetics and genetic ties. 
But can we limit individuals' access to these technologies without 
critically trampling our protection of individual freedom from unwar-
ranted government intrusion? After all, governments have perpe-
trated as much injustice on the theory that individual interests must be 
sacrificed for the public good as they have on the theory that equality 
must be sacrificed for individual liberty. This was the rationale justify-
ing eugenic sterilization laws enacted earlier in this century.58 
Even for liberals, individuals' freedom to use reproductive tech-
nologies is not absolute. Most liberals would place some limit on their 
use, perhaps by defining the legitimate reasons for procreation.59 If a 
core view of reproduction can limit individuals' personal procreative 
decisions, then why not consider a view that takes into account repro-
duction's role in social arrangements of wealth and power? If the 
harm to an individual child or even to a core notion of procrearion can 
justify barring her parents from using the technique of their choice, 
then why not the new reproduction's potential for worsening group 
inequality? 
Some have concluded that the harms caused by certain reproduc-
tion-assisting practices justify their prohibition. In 1985, for example, 
the United Kingdom passed the Surrogacy Arrangements Act ban-
ning coiTLmercial contract pregnancy arrangements and imposing fines 
and/or imprisonment on the brokers who negotiate these agree-
ments.60 Some Iv'Iarxist and radical feminists agree that paid preg-
58. See Mark H. Haller , Eugenics: Hereditarian A ttitudes in American Thought 
(1963). 
59. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 2, at 167 (positing "a core view of the goa ls and 
values of reproduction" that limits an individual's right to shape offspring characteristi cs) . 
60. Rosemarie Tong, Fem inist Perspectives on Gestational Mo therhood: The Search 
for a Unified Focus, in REPRO DUCTION, ETH~CS , AND THE L.A.W: F E MIN IST PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 11 , a t 55,58 (cit ing Surrogacy Arrangeme nts Act, 1985, United Kingdom, C hap-
ter 49, p.2 (1)(a)(b)(c)) . 
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nancy contracts should be criminalized to prevent their exploitation 
and commodification of women and children.61 
On the other hand, the government need not depart at all from 
the liberal noninterference model of rights in order to discourage or 
refuse to support practices that contribute to social injustice.62 Even 
the negative view of liberty that protects procreative choice from gov-
ernment intrusion leaves the state free to decide not to lend assistance 
to the fertility business or its clients. 
We may therefore question a practice that channels millions of 
dollars into the fertility business, rather than spending si..rnilar 
amounts on programs that would provide more extensive benefits to 
infertile people. New York Times writer Trip Gabriel describes IVF 
clinics as "[a] virtually free-market branch of medicine, the $350 mil-
lion-a-year business has been largely exempt from government regula-
tion and from the downward pressure on costs that insurance 
companies exert. "63 
Indeed, we can no longer avoid these concerns about the social 
costs and benefits of IVF. Such calculations are now part of the de-
bate surrounding the advisability of state laws requiring insurance 
companies to include the cost of fertility treatment in their coverage. 
A study recently reported in the New England Journal of Medicine 
calculated the real cost of IVF at approximately $67,000 to $114,000 
per successful delivery.64 The authors concluded that the debate 
about insurance coverage must take into account these economic im-
plications of IVF, as well as ethical and social judgments about re-
source allocation.6s 
Black women in particular would he better served by a focus on 
the basic improvement of conditions that lead to infertility, such as 
occupational and environmental hazards, diseases, and complications 
following childbirth and abortion.66 
61. !d. at 64-68. 
62. Callahan & Roberts, supra note 55. 
63. Gabriel, supra note 20, a t 10. 
64. Peter J. Neum an et a!. , The Cost of a Successful D elivery with In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 239, 239 (1994). Unlike the $8,000 cost per !VF cycle men-
tioned above, the figu res quoted in this study refer to the cost involved in the birth of at 
least one live baby as a result of an IVF cycle . 
65 . !d. 
66. See Nadi ne Ta ub , Surrogacy: A Preferred Treatm ent fo r Infenility ?, 16 L. MEo. & 
HEALT H CARE 89 (1 988) . 
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Taking these social justice concerns more seriously, then, might 
justify government efforts to reallocate resources away from expen-
sive reproductive technologies. 
Conclusion 
These are thorny questions. It is extremely difficult to untangle 
white couples' reasons for using reproduction-assisting technologies 
and Black couples' reasons for avoiding them. Evidence is hard to 
come by: what doctor or fertility clinic will admit (at least publicly) to 
steering Black women away from their services? Few people seem to 
want to confront the obvious complexion of this field. Moreover, the 
problems raised by the racial disparity in the use of these technologies 
will not be solved merely by attempting to expand their distribution. 
Indeed, the concerns I have raised in this essay may be best addressed 
by placing restrictions on the use and development of the technolo-
gies, restrictions imposed by the government or encouraged by moral 
persuasion. This possibility is met by a legitimate concern about pro-
tection of our private decisions from government scrutiny. Indeed, 
Black women are most vulnerable to government efforts to control 
their reproductive lives. 
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the negative impact that the racial 
disparity and imagery of the new reproduction can have on racial ine-
quality in America. Our vision of procreative liberty must include the 
eradication of group oppression, and not just a concern for protecting 
the reproductive choices of the most privileged. It must also include 
alternative conceptions of the family and the significance of genetic 
relatedness that truly challenge the dominant meaning of family. 
